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Abstract: This article aims to explore the different accountability discourses of 
the various actors in the Spanish international aid system and to examine them in 
light of the various theoretical interpretations of development accountability. 
The conclusions reached suggest a technical and ﬁnancial accountability 
model, largely isolated from international debates where political and social 
issues are at the core of the concept. Although this can be explained by a range of 
factors which are speciﬁc to the Spanish aid system, there are also interesting 
tendencies that are deepening a new understanding and practice of the idea.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This article presents the ﬁndings of a study carried out by a multidisciplinary 
research team between June 2008 and November 2009. The aim of the study was 
to explore the different accountability discourses of the various actors in the 
Spanish international aid system and to examine them in light of the various 
theoretical interpretations of accountability in relation to development. 
The project’s objectives are framed by the international debates on aid 
effectiveness, of which the most visible account is reﬂected in the processes of 
Paris/Accra fostered by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). In this context, to understand what quality of aid implies 
inevitably entails talking about accountability. Discussing the quality of Spanish 
overseas development assistance (ODA) has gained relevance as the country has 
become, in a relatively short time, one of the most important donors.
1
1 Spain is 
also a point of reference in the context of the European Union because of its 
relationship with Latin America. However, important changes are still needed to 
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 improve its policies and actions concerning accountability (Intermón Oxfam 
2011). This is all the more challenging as its decentralised governance system 
adds complexity to accountability processes and mechanisms. 
This article is structured as follows: the ﬁrst part contains a description of 
accountability within the framework of the present aid effectiveness agenda and 
a brief description of the Spanish development aid system. The second part 
describes the approach adopted by the study and the methodology used. The 
third part deals with some interpretations of the meaning, actors, and 
mechanisms involved in accountability in international aid. The fourth part 
discusses the evidence as found by the study in relation to Spanish aid, and 
suggestions are made as to how to improve its accountability. The ﬁnal 
section sums up our most salient ﬁndings and concludes. 
 
1.1 Paris Declaration and Accountability 
In 2005, a hundred aid donor and recipient nations signed the Paris Declaration 
on Aid Effectiveness (PD), within a process set in motion by the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. These countries signed a 
commitment to ‘take far-reaching and monitorable actions to reform the ways 
we deliver and manage aid’ (OECD, 2005). For this, ﬁve working rules were 
established, the ﬁfth of which referred to mutual account- ability. This was 
deﬁned as both ‘partner’ (i.e. developing) and donor countries giving priority 
to increasing accountability and transparency in the use of development funds. 
In the agreement signed in Accra in 2008, which followed the line of the PD, 
the term mutual accountability lost some of the prominence given to it in the PD. 
It did not ﬁgure in any of the main headings and was only mentioned in 
Paragraphs 19 and 31, in the latter to express gratitude to ECOSOC for its 
‘international dialogue and mutual responsibility’. 
However, although the principle of mutual accountability may not have the 
same force as other principles of the PD, it can still be considered an essential 
part of understanding international aid, and although it is aimed principally at 
states, it can also have implications for non-governmental aid. Indeed, a demand 
for a mutual accountability that goes beyond donors and governments has been 
voiced by social platforms in and after the Paris/Accra process (Civil Society 
Voices for Better Aid, 2008; ISG, 2007). 
 
1.2 The Spanish Aid System 
Spain was a latecomer to the international development aid system. Unlike 
other donor countries, until 1979, Spain was considered by the World Bank to be 
a developing country with medium–high income. In 1983, at its own request, it 
ceased to have aid-recipient status (Tezanos, 2008: 39). In 1985, the Sub-
Department of State for IberoAmerica was created, which changed its name in 
 2004 to the Sub-Department of State for International Aid (SECI
2 in Spanish) 
and is the principal organization for formulating Spanish inter- national aid 
policy. In 1988, the Spanish International Development Agency (AECID
3
) was 
founded as the implementing agency of national-level aid policy and coordinator 
of a network of 42 technical cooperation ofﬁces, mainly located in Latin 
America. 
Also created in 1988 was the Planning and Evaluation Ofﬁce, which in 2005 
became the Directorate-General of Planning and Evaluation of Development 
Policies (DGPOLDE
4
). Its role consists of assisting the SECI to formulate, 
plan, monitor, and evaluate Spanish international aid policy. It also coordinates 
external relations with inter- national organizations such as the DAC and 
OECD. The DGPOLDE is responsible for drawing up policy documents on 
aid at the national (Spanish state) level, such as the national aid policy 
document, in Spanish the Plan Director, established by law in 1998 (the third 
Plan Director is now in force for 2009–2012), annual plans, strategy papers 
for individual countries, and operational plans (Meyer, 2007: 12). 
In the ﬁrst decade of the 21st century, Spain has played a leading role in global 
aid governance structures. In 2000, it signed the UN’s Millennium Summit 
Declaration and between 2003 and 2008 took part in all the conferences 
organised by the DAC. In 2008, Spain devoted 0.45% of its gross domestic 
product (GDP) to overseas development aid (€4800 million), which was over 
€1000 million more than in 2007 and the largest sum ever spent by Spanish aid 
organizations (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación, 2009:8). 
Provisional DAC ﬁgures for aid in 2009 placed Spain seventh in the world among 
donor countries, with a total aid budget of $6.57 billion (Development Co-
operation Directorate, 2010). 
Among the chief coordinating bodies for Spanish aid are the Development Aid 
Council and the Inter-Territorial Development Aid Commission. The former is 
an advisory body that brings together the principal actors involved in aid (civil 
society organizations, other social actors involved in aid, and representatives of 
the Spanish state). It was established in 1995 in response to mass social 
mobilization in favour of devoting 0.7% of GDP to international aid (Meyer, 
2007: 15). This council put into action Law 23/1998, which regulates the 
objectives and workings of aid policy (Tezanos, 2008: 47). 
The latter organization, the Inter-Territorial Development Aid Commission, 
testiﬁes to the high degree of decentralisation of Spanish aid. It brings together 
representatives from the seventeen “autonomous communities” (the  
autonomously governed  regions into which the Spanish state is divided), besides 
diputaciones or provinces (the next administrative division below the level of 
autonomous communities) and municipalities and local councils, which are all 
empowered to provide development aid in their own right to partners in Spain and 
the global south. The aid provided by the autonomous communities and more 
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 local levels of government (known in Spain as decentralised aid) in 2008 
comprised 18.42% of bilateral ODA (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y 
Cooperación, 2009). 
Autonomous communities’ and local governments’ aid policy frameworks 
have instituted aid advisory councils as policy spaces to enable social 
participation in aid activities, in much the same way as the state Development Aid 
Council. They have also drawn up aid strategies or annual plans (Montiel, 2007: 
75; Sánchez, 2007: 171). 
Development non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are another 
important actor group in Spanish international aid. According to ﬁgures from the 
Spanish NGO Coordinating Body (comprising 87 development NGOs and 16 
coordinating bodies from various autonomous regions), in 2007, Spanish 
NGOs obtained €669 million, 54.3% of which came from public bodies and 
the rest from private sources (Coordinadora Estatal de Cooperación al 
Desarrollo, 2008: 20). 
Spanish development NGOs are of diverse types. The oldest were created during 
Franco’s dictatorship, and others appeared during the subsequent political 
transition as expressions of international solidarity. A very signiﬁcant time for 
Spanish NGOs was during the popular demonstrations to demand that 0.7% of 
the GDP be devoted to international aid (1994–2000). During this period, the 
Law on International Development Aid was passed, and the NGO 
Coordinating Body’s Code of Conduct was drawn up. 
Our study on accountability discourses in the Spanish aid system took place 
within this crowded decentralised scenario. We faced a difﬁcult challenge 
because exploring the Spanish aid system implies exploring not a single central 
administration, but 17 autonomous communities plus a large number of 
provincial and municipal organizations, besides countless NGOs that provide aid 
derived from public and private sources. 
 
2. APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY 
The study lay within an applied qualitative social research paradigm that situated 
its analysis ﬁrmly within the social and historical context in which it occurred and 
through which it is interpreted (Corbetta, 2003; Flick et al., 2004; Valles, 1996). 
We therefore sought to access the perspectives of the different actors 
involved in the Spanish aid system to understand the different meanings they 
attach to the idea and practice of accountability. It therefore carries the premise 
that gathering information on the different actors’ interpretations of accountability 
is a good way of understanding how this concept is taking shape within the context 
of Spanish aid and subsequently of formulating realistic proposals that the actors 
themselves would ﬁnd useful when developing their policies. 
Work was carried out in three basic stages. The ﬁrst consisted of a desk-based 
 review of the literature and critical debates on accountability in the development aid 
system. In the course of this review, we analysed what light the discourses of 
academics, donors, and NGOs shed on four key accountability questions, which 
draw closely on questions posed by Newell (2006) and Goetz and Jenkins (2005): 
(1) what is it and why is it necessary? (2) Who should account to whom? (3) How 
is accountability practised and by what means can control be exercised over 
power holders? (4) In what forums can it be expected and looked for? 
This was followed by a stage of empirical research on Spanish participants, in 
the form of 37 in-depth semistructured interviews, representing all 32 
organisations. Through these, we gathered the perspectives of (1) technicians 
and politicians from the state level (ﬁve interviews with AECID and 
DGPOLDE representatives), autonomous communities (six interviews with 
representatives of development policy units in the Valencian, Basque, and 
Catalan governments), and local administrations (four interviews with 
representatives of two major cities, Barcelona and Valencia, and two smaller 
towns, one in the province of Barcelona and another in the province of Valencia); 
(2) members of international, Spanish, and local development NGOs (seven 
NGOs); (3) private sector companies (one public company and one private); 
and (4) universities and different types of experts (10 representatives). Given the 
shape of the Spanish aid system, the sampling strategy took into account a 
vertical dimension (considering the different governance levels) and the plurality 
of actors at each level that participate in the ODA funding chain. The 
interviewees at each governance level were sampled due to their relevance and 
because they substantially con- tribute (by position, experience, or knowledge) to 
the Spanish accountability debate.
5 The key consideration in sampling was not 
any kind of statistical representativity but an attempt to capture a 
representative spread of accountability discourses. 
The formulation of the key research hypotheses or propositions was an iterative 
process. Four research propositions were initially formulated to direct 
researchers’ attention, which were then reviewed after the literature review and 
reﬁned even further after the interviews. From this mass of data, 25 variables 
were deﬁned with which the qualitative empirical material was analysed using 
the HyperResearch software package. In the next sections, we give some of the 
key debates that emerged in the course of the literature review and which were 
subsequently used to guide discussion on accountability discourses in the 
Spanish aid system. These are generally gathered as crosscutting issues 
stemming from the universe of sources consulted. Wherever possible, we note 
whether an idea or debate pertains to a collective or individual actor. 
 
3. FRAMING THE ENQUIRY: MEANINGS OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
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 3.1 What Is Accountability and Why Is it Necessary? 
From a theoretical point of view, Goetz and Jenkins deﬁned accountability as ’the 
relation- ship where A is accountable to B if A is obliged to explain and justify his 
actions to B, or if A may suffer sanctions if his conduct, or explanation for it, is 
found wanting by B’ (Goetz and Jenkins, 2005:8). 
This allows us to distinguish between two dimensions of accountability: 
answerability, which is both the obligation to give an answer and the right to 
obtain an answer, and enforceability, which is the capacity to demand an 
action and ensure that it is carried out and access to corrective (and punitive) 
measures when accountability fails (Goetz and Jenkins, 2005; Newell and 
Bellour, 2002). 
The capacity to demand and exercise accountability therefore requires power. In 
academic discourses, it is assumed that accountability cannot be reduced to a purely 
technical perspective related to inspection and management systems (Eyben, 2008; 
Goetz and Jenkins, 2005; Newell, 2006), but it must be understood from the 
perspective of established power relation- ships. Here, it is interesting to note three 
of the most frequent sorts of barrier to accountability: vacuums or spaces reserved 
for those in authority and not subjected to accountability; bias, or practices that, 
although not illegal, do beneﬁt privileged groups; and capture, either by elites or 
via illegal use of power such as vote buying or corruption (Goetz and Jenkins, 
2005). In line with this, Eyben (2008) emphasised the ‘relational’ nature of 
accountability, stressing, rather than the actors themselves, the relationships 
between them, which are formed in ways reﬂective of power and conditioned by 
speciﬁc historical trajectories. 
Academic commentators tend to situate accountability within the framework 
of democratic rights and duties, often with reference to rights-based approaches 
to development on citizenship, which emphasise citizens’ capacity to claim 
their rights, accountability mechanisms, and the institutional capacity for 
designing and reporting on development (Piron, 2004). This is in contrast to the 
donor countries’ point of view as expressed in the PD (OECD, 2005) and the 
Accra Agenda for Action (OECD, 2008), in which the concept of mutual 
accountability emerges as one of the key innovations for aid effectiveness and 
effectively crosscuts the rest of the PD principles (OECD, 2007:16). De 
Renzio and Mulley (2006) highlighted how the concept of accountability in the 
PD highlights answerability aspects, but not those of enforceability. 
In the ambit of the development NGOs, the panorama is more diverse. Here, 
representation seems to be a fundamental question, and the opinion is that this 
should not be limited to the political sphere but extended to include social 
representation, as a constitutive element of any democracy (Peruzzotti, 2006). 
However, until quite recently, NGO account- ability focused on technical 
solutions that often failed to reﬂect the mission, values, and multiplicity of 
important relationships in which they were involved (Jordan and Van Tuijl, 2006: 
6). Two contradictory tendencies stand out. On one hand, ‘bringing the state back 
in’ as a principal development actor favours a concept of accountability premised 
on the ‘projection of credibility and the promotion of external (state) control’. On 
 the other hand, seen from the perspective of rights-based approaches, NGOs 
contribute to democratic governance, so accountability is about ‘balancing the 
multiple responsibilities to the many actors involved by different means, 
favouring harmonisation instead of regulation’ (Jordan and Van Tuijl, 2006: 12–
13). At the ﬁeld level, NGOs’ accountability to those with whom they work 
generates inherent tensions (Harsh et al., 2010). 
Among the leading international organisations and initiatives focused on 
accountability, certain ones stand out: Action Aid as a radical organizational 
transformation process (Chambers and Pettit, 2004:147; Jordan and Van Tuijl, 
2006: 18); the Global Accountability Project (GAP) of One World Trust and its 
emphasis on transparency, participation, evaluation, and complaint-response 
mechanisms (Blagescu et al., 2005: 23); AccountAbility, which emphasises 
governance frameworks in the establishment of collaboration initiatives (Litovsky 
and Macgillivray, 2007: 15); the EURODAD network, which aspires to 
contribute an element of enforceability to mutual accountability (Hayes and 
Pereira 2008: 45); or the initiatives taken by leading international NGOs 
(ActionAid, Amnesty International, Greenpeace, Oxfam, among others) in 
subscribing to the INGO Accountability Charter.
6
 
 
3.2 Who Is Accountable to Whom? 
Accountability has traditionally been understood in terms of the means at citizens’ 
disposal to control the behaviour of the state, encompassing vertical forms such as 
elections and horizontal forms such as mutual control among state bodies. 
However, the transformation and reconﬁguration of relationships between 
citizens, the private sector, the state, society and international institutions within 
the context of globalisation point to the need to contemplate a wider range of actors 
in accountability processes (Goetz and Jenkins, 2005; Newell, 2006). The 
distinction made between an agent (the one obliged to give account, understood 
as an actor to whom power has been delegated) and a seeker (the one who has the 
right to demand accountability, being the legitimate source of the agent’s power) 
is a useful one because it allows the roles of the different actors in the 
international aid system to be easily classiﬁed. The aid system is characterised not 
only by an increase of numbers of agents and seekers but also by an increase in 
related methods and areas in which accountability is demanded and offered and 
by the diversity of roles each actor can perform (Goetz and Jenkins, 2005). 
Different types of accountability arise. Political accountability is related to 
representative democracy, and its principal actor is the state in its relations 
both with its citizens and between its own institutions. Social accountability 
originates from rights discourses and is about how citizen action redeﬁnes 
citizens’ relationships with their political representatives and the state. Financial 
accountability is linked to the workings, results, and accounts of organizations 
and proclaims itself to be apolitical and technical. Civil account- ability is the 
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 expression of active citizens, is not directed so much at state institutions, and 
involves different types of activism (Newell, 2006; Newell and Bellour, 2002). 
These kinds of strategy can generate either what Newell (2006) called active 
account- ability, which is continually negotiated and assumes both the right 
and the capacity to make demands, or passive accountability, in which the 
initiative lies with those who have been given the authority to act in the name of 
others. 
In contrast to this academic view of accountability, donors’ discourses are 
based on a strongly state-centred perspective. The mutual accountability of the PD 
refers mainly to relations between donor countries and partner countries (Droop et 
al., 2008:1). Although this view was further reﬁned in the Accra Agenda for 
Action (OECD, 2008), it is still a political and ﬁnancial type of accountability, 
according to Newell’s classiﬁcation (2006), which sug- gests an ambiguous 
relationship with citizens (Wood et al., 2008) and makes no reference to the fact 
that there are actors that actively seek accountability or have a right to claim it. 
In contrast, the civil society actors organised around the Paris process opt for a 
rights-centred approach as the regulatory and organizational framework for 
accountability within the aid system (Eyben, 2008:12) and demands that 
mutual accountability should go beyond donors and governments (Civil 
Society Voices for Better Aid, 2008; ISG, 2007). However, the debate is 
restricted to a group of openly political development NGOs (Bendell, 
2006:78) and even the position of the GAP appears to be on the passive side 
insofar as it only requires NGOs to account for themselves. 
 
4. EXPLORING MEANINGS AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
PRACTICES IN THE SPANISH AID SYSTEM. 
4.1 How Do Spanish Actors in International Aid Understand Accountability? 
By interviewing participants in both non-governmental and government aid 
organizations (state, autonomous, and local), we gathered evidence concerning 
their ideas on the nature, range, and signiﬁcance of this concept. 
A large majority of the actors understand accountability to mean accounting 
for them- selves and being transparent in relation to the use of the funds 
obtained, tending to limit the concept to auditing or ﬁnancial control. Some also 
include the idea of impact or evaluation, considering that accountability should 
include explaining not only how money has been spent but also what results 
have been obtained. Consistent with this view, quality management systems are 
cited as accountability mechanisms, evincing a clear prevalence of what the 
literature calls ﬁnancial accountability. Some government actors, trying to live up 
to international standards and widen the prevailing concept of accountability, 
speak of mutual responsibility vis-a-vis southern countries but in general are 
referring more to accountability exercised through political institutions than 
social or civil accountability. 
 The rationale for accountability encountered among our respondents is 
fundamentally legal, and in certain cases ethical, but nowhere is power 
mentioned as a key element in accountability relationships. Accountability is 
considered as a relationship–management problem, but when its mechanisms 
are examined, no reference is made to reviewing the power relationships 
established between those who may demand accountability and those whose duty 
it is to provide it. 
On the question of which actors are involved in accountability relationships, 
there was a general consensus that accounts should be rendered to those who 
provide funding. Mention was often made of the obligation and need to improve 
accountability to northern citizens and to their representatives: parliaments, 
councils, etc. The NGOs included their members and sponsors when listing 
who was involved in accountability relationships. However, in most cases, 
accountability to the southern partners and to those who receive the aid was not 
mentioned. 
Another objective of our research was to determine which elements in the 
Spanish con- text might shape the concept of accountability held by the 
interviewees. In relation to this, we identiﬁed three important elements: 
decentralisation, dependence on public funds, and the existing spaces for 
reﬂection. 
Concerning decentralisation, there is a wide diversity in Spanish development 
aid sys- tem, and both regional governments and local councils express a 
preference for relation- ships between actors in the system to be non-hierarchical 
and horizontal networks. Thus, although at the national level aid given by 
autonomous communities is considered to usurp positions that rightly belong to 
the state, the actors providing decentralised aid are legitimated both by legal 
frameworks and by the backing they receive from private citizens. 
As for the non-governmental sector, its independence and capacity to demand 
account- ability from the state and autonomous community governments are 
somewhat restricted by its reliance on public funds. Also, because there has 
been no debate on which kind of accountability and which mechanisms are most 
appropriate for this sector, its demands have been limited to ﬁnancial and technical 
matters. Because there are no standardised procedures among the different public 
sources of funds, this has meant considerable work for the NGOs. In relation to the 
above, it should be remembered that the public administrations (especially the 
central, state, administration) constitute a de facto regulatory organism, although 
they are made up of executive and not legislative or judicial bodies. This means 
that even if they do not have the backing of regulations or laws, the public 
development aid bodies have the most say in establishing criteria for 
determining the quality of the aid projects undertaken by the NGOs. The 
dependence of these organizations on public funds presents challenges as soon as 
wider concepts of accountability are considered. 
Another element analysed in the Spanish aid context was its organisational 
culture and the (few) possibilities for reﬂection available to the actors. We had 
already assumed that both elements limited the concepts of accountability held 
 by the interviewees. In fact, the evidence gathered by the study shows that 
processes of improvement and debate around accountability are correlated with 
advancing maturity, the gradual acquisition of a learning-oriented culture of 
evaluation (and self-evaluation, still much more incipient), and participation in 
international debates and forums. 
 
4.2 What Are the Accountability Practices in Use? 
The Spanish aid system broadly speaking practices ﬁnancial accountability. 
However, when political accountability is examined, there is a certain amount 
of friction between the different aid actors as a result of the decentralised and 
non-hierarchical Spanish model. 
The autonomous communities interviewed maintain that accountability is 
expected and provided from the autonomous regions to the central government, 
but not in the opposite direction. Direct accounting to citizens from the 
different public bodies is very scarce and weak. 
Although certain actors do incorporate elements of social accountability in 
their dis- course by mentioning the societies as well as governments of partner 
countries, this is not reﬂected in practice, as the mechanisms are either non-
existent or scarcely deﬁned. Government aid actors speak of social 
accountability mainly with reference to Spanish society and information 
provision, that is, forms involving very little active participation or involvement 
by citizens. People’s participation or involvement is made possible and is 
recognised in the form of multi-stakeholder bodies such as aid councils, in which 
their role is limited to being consulted or simply being informed. 
Another generalised practice is to understand accountability simply as 
transparency, assuming that being visible is the same as giving adequate 
account, be what they may the underlying processes. Accountability is also 
confused with information provision. In such cases, information provision 
appears almost a public relations exercise: some of those interviewed complained 
that information is often given out so that the organization involved can 
‘give itself a pat on the back’. In partner countries, accountability in the form of 
the transparency of aid actions is questioned on the basis that it might 
undermine the country’s government and institutional standing by showing it in 
a bad light. 
The actors interviewed broadly concur that there is a need to both widen the 
accountability discourse and improve practices. In the speciﬁc case of the Spanish 
International Development Agency, the DGPOLDE, and the organizations from 
the autonomous regions that were interviewed, it was acknowledged that civil 
society is given little account. It was also emphasised that there are strong 
asymmetries affecting accountability relationships and that, although ﬁnancial 
accountability is largely taken on board and performed, at least in the public 
administration, the issue of accountability should be taken further. 
  
4.3 What Barriers Exist? 
Based on the evidence we gathered, it appears that considerable accountability 
challenges are inherent to the decentralised Spanish system, affecting especially 
the accountability of state actors. As previously stated, friction exists between the 
different aid-providing actors in Spain because of their functioning within a 
decentralised and non-hierarchical model. It was also clear that the decentralised 
Spanish political system produces gaps in accountability in the sense that, as 
maintained by the autonomous community government actors inter- viewed, they 
are accountable to the state government but the state government is not 
accountable to them. The decentralised model generates dynamics in which the 
autonomous communities and local entities have legitimate grounds for demanding 
accountability from the central government and passing it on to their inhabitants 
and taxpayers. 
Interesting reﬂections arose on state coordinating bodies, such as the 
Development Aid Council and the Inter-Territorial Aid Commission. Despite 
their potential, they are not always capable of delivering accountability. The 
interviewees stressed three points: (1) dysfunctions due to their dual nature as 
organs of both inter-ministerial coordination and “expert groups”, (2) the NGO 
members’ ﬁnancial dependence on government funds, and (3) strengthening of 
bilateral relations between government actors and development NGOs in these 
spaces, with scant concern for creating or using more open and multilateral spaces. 
Private interests, clientelism, and self-interested use of power differences 
between actors obstruct effective accountability in bodies such as the aid 
councils and constrain the improvement of accountability mechanisms. 
In the ambit of development NGOs, the coordinating bodies function as a 
control element in that they can improve the proper and effective use of resources. 
However, the frag- mentation, proliferation, and competition between NGOs 
make it difﬁcult to coordinate diverse interests in collective initiatives. 
Worthy of note was the conﬂict between aid and other objectives, such as the 
international image of the government or commercial or economic agenda. The 
study shows that high-visibility ofﬁcial development aid projects, promoted with 
an eye to political advantage, involves investing in areas that are not very 
strategically important to the partner country but are high proﬁle for the donor. 
Finally, we detected the existence of technical barriers that prevented the 
improvement of accountability, such as a lack of ﬁnancial resources and the fact 
that the basic unit of accountability is basically and almost exclusively the 
development project. This makes it difﬁcult to widen debates to embrace the 
role of aid in development processes, which are complex, integral, and happen 
over long periods. 
The dependence on public funds to ﬁnance projects stands out as a signiﬁcant 
constraint. There is no incentive—in fact, there are negative incentives—on the 
 part of those who receive public funds (Spanish NGOs) to criticise or question 
the discourses and practices of the government which (co-)ﬁnances them. The 
same factor limits the plurality of perspectives and preferences of the sector in 
general. 
The general scarcity of spaces for reﬂection within the organizations and 
institutions constitutes a ﬁnal constraint. None of the leading international 
actors in the discourse and practice of accountability have achieved this position 
without consciously and systematically creating spaces and time for profound and 
self-critical reﬂection that allows them to think beyond day-to-day mindsets and 
procedures and enables them to see that things can be done differently. 
 
4.4 Change Processes Under Way: Scope for Improved Accountability 
Despite the limitations we found in conceptions and practices of accountability, 
we identiﬁed certain change processes in the Spanish aid system that directly 
relate to some of the most important factors in how accountability is conceived 
and practiced. 
The ﬁrst clear tendency is the will to bring Spanish aid in line with the 
standards set in international declarations, a logical consequence of which is to 
bring southern actors into view as actors entitled to accountability. However, 
although the concept of mutual accountability contained in the PD has the 
potential to put this question on the agenda, in practice, the accountability that 
is provided even by core PD signatories is vitiated by the power relationships 
inherent in the international aid system. It is therefore important that the actors 
in this system be aware of these barriers and set in motion critical review 
procedures that address head-on the power relationships between northern and 
southern partners. 
Second, some actors consider that the quality of relationships is starting to be 
recognised as a strategic element in aid effectiveness. In this area, a decisive 
step toward authentic mutual accountability would be to explicitly step beyond 
mere technical and ﬁnancial accountability to introduce and promote elements of 
political, social, or civil accountability as well. A key locus where this sort of 
change cries out to be introduced is in the calls for co-ﬁnancing applications, 
issued by public bodies, which are the principal vehicle via which NGDOs 
obtain funds. If these calls explicitly required bids to address accountability 
concerns in a broader way, incorporating aspects of social and political 
accountability and aid effectiveness that go well beyond narrow “value-for-
money” criteria, this would have an immediate multiplier effect. Similarly, a 
change in policy toward co-ﬁnancing larger long-term projects instead of small, 
short-lived projects and toward allocating funds on the basis of bidding 
organizations’ capacity and experience would help reinforce good partnership 
and mutual trust between northern NGOs and their southern partners. 
We observed a tendency to classify quality control systems as accountability 
mechanisms, which attests to a shift from accountability as merely ﬁnancial control 
 to accountability as relating also to objectives and results. This shift would be 
favoured by introducing into quality debates some reﬂection on process 
indicators and on how to assess the quality of aid relationships as inherent aspects 
of quality control. Today’s dominant results-based management framework could 
thus be used to bring in accountability in a way that emphasises not only material 
and visible results but also the relationships among the actors involved in 
development processes. 
There has also been a change in the importance attached to evaluation and a 
growing realization of the importance of systematizing experiences, 
developments which could and should be accompanied by a burgeoning culture 
of learning within organizations. Both within the NGOs themselves and among 
other public and private actors, much could be achieved by promoting 
evaluations designed not for inspection and control purposes, but for 
encouraging reﬂection and the questioning of organizational practices and values 
in different working contexts. 
The research has highlighted the potential role of coordination spaces in 
generating accountability and reconsidering its meaning. NGO coordinating 
bodies should not only require accountability from governments, but should also 
pause to consider what the term means within the NGO world: who therein 
should be obliged to account, to whom, and how. It is especially important that 
this debate be extended to small NGOs with no representation in these 
coordinating fora. In the case of the ofﬁcial aid coordinating bodies of the 
central administration, there is an urgent need to reconsider their workings and 
reﬂect on how they can be transformed into mutual accountability spaces. 
The need for legitimacy and credibility is increasingly evident to aid actors of 
the kinds we interviewed. For this, it is essential to improve their transparency, 
improving communication and access to information and opening them up better 
to effective public scrutiny. 
These potentially promising changes, however, need to be weighed up in light 
of the strong evidence we found of a Spanish political culture that tends to 
shy away from demanding accountability, a tendency accentuated in the case of 
development aid, which is seen by the public as something non-vital in their 
daily affairs. If we want to proceed further than merely technical and ﬁnancial 
accountability, many channels and funding sources (e.g. for development 
education) currently exist for supporting such endeavours. It is only through a 
concerted and energetic use of these that progress will be made toward a 
more active accountability providing openings for more effective and 
actual—as opposed to potential—participation on the part of civil society 
organisations and the general public. 
A salient ﬁnding was that for accountability to deepen, diversify, and spread 
organizations’ staffs’ need to include specialized and appropriately trained 
personnel. If account- ability perspectives are to be widened, this implies not 
only technical training but also exposure to practices and approaches different to 
those used in Spanish development aid. Aid actors in the north and south should 
therefore incorporate into their human resource policies continuous staff 
 development about innovative approaches to accountability. This could include 
participation in international forums, secondments of and exchanges between 
technical staff, training to international standards, and openings for forming 
alliances with universities and research centres. 
Regarding ﬁeld-level operations in the ﬁeld, what seems most urgent is to stop 
thinking and acting in terms of projects and start thinking in terms of 
transformative and change processes over the long term. This has strong 
implications for accountability because it would shift the spotlight off 
accounting for funds or strategy objectives and onto the organizations with 
which alliances are formed and the network of relationships fostered as central 
resources for supporting complex change processes. Only by considering the 
diversity of the actors involved, the diversity of possible forms, and the role of 
power relationships will we be able to consistently construct new ideas, 
dynamics, and accountability practices. 
Table 1 synthesises the key points of the section. 
 
Table 1. Main features of accountability discourse identified when analysing 
accountability’s meanings and practices 
  
NGOs, non-governmental organisations. 
  
 5. CONCLUSIONS 
This article has analysed the dominant types of accountability in the international 
aid sec- tor among both governmental and non-governmental actors. What we 
found in operation was a technical and ﬁnancial model of accountability, largely 
isolated from contemporary international debates on the topic. 
Dominant ways of exercising accountability are shaped by various factors, 
including the complex, highly decentralised governance model containing a 
myriad of actors, in which the responsibilities and competences of those who 
are accountable and those they are accountable to are either weakly deﬁned, 
diluted, or, in the worst instances, an object of political confrontation. Another 
salient determinant is the lack of speciﬁc academic training in development that 
prevails among Spanish aid representatives at state level; the degree to which 
these can be considered development or aid professionals is well below what 
one might expect given the country’s high volumes of aid, which have placed 
Spain in the sixth place in the international aid donor table. The examination of 
technical competences was not an objective of the study, nor were the stafﬁng 
policies of the public and private organizations involved in development aid, 
but as experts on the subject have pointed out (Schulz, 2010), there is a serious 
problem of lack of professionalism in the sec- tor overall. We also observed that 
actors are not always coordinated and aid objectives sometimes enter into 
conﬂict with other objectives such as commercial or economic agenda or 
attempts to reap political beneﬁts. 
The development NGOs appear to be highly dependent on public funding at 
different levels and their accountability directed more at the funding bodies than 
at their southern partners or their own members, and there is little incentive for 
them to change this state of affairs. Add to this a Spanish society which generally 
shows little interest in the destination of public and private funds, and it becomes 
clear that changing this state of affairs will not be easy. 
Although it was not one of our main objectives to ﬁnd an explanation for this 
situation, we can offer some hypotheses. One of these is that the recentness of 
Spain’s transition to democracy limits the degree of interest shown by its citizens 
in accountability and transparency. This hypothesis would require further 
investigation to substantiate it and to identify ways to improve accountability 
despite it, not only in the international aid sector but in all other public policy 
areas and in the actions of private organizations too. 
We came across certain clues in our study as how the desirable changes might 
happen— interesting tendencies which, although they do not affect all the 
actors in the Spanish system, are visible in the work of organizations and 
institutions exposed to international discourses and forums, both governmental 
and non-governmental. Many of our interviewees made it clear that it is 
necessary to improve coordination among all the actors so that all concerned can 
take part in this debate. 
The evaluation culture is also becoming more widespread in Spain, and 
interesting things are being learned from it that can contribute to improving 
 accountability. The introduction of quality mechanisms may also encourage 
transparency and accountability. (However, it is important that quality does not 
get understood purely as ﬁnancial account- ability, a tendency which, as we have 
pointed out above, can imply a reduction of effectiveness and efﬁciency of real 
aid accountability, diverting human and technical resources from the really 
important work.) This is associated with increasing professionalism in the sector, 
which would ensure that the human resources deployed in aid are well 
acquainted with the importance of accountability. It also seems to be necessary to 
improve informative actions directed at the Spanish public to convince people of 
the beneﬁts of aid practices becoming more accountable. 
Finally, because in this article we have shown a clear preference for an 
accountability model that goes beyond technical and ﬁnancial information, we 
consider that the power relationships between all those who participate in 
development actions, in both north and south, should be made visible so that 
mechanisms can be adopted that foster greater horizontality in practice as well 
as in principle. 
All these are important challenges that should be considered within the 
framework of the present economic crisis, which has had an enormous impact in 
Spain. In the coming years, we will doubtless see a considerable reduction in 
the funds devoted to ODA (Intermón Oxfam 2011). It remains to be seen 
whether these cuts have an effect on the quality of aid actions or whether they 
will be an encouragement to organizations and institutions to offer improved 
projects and incorporate not only technical accountability mechanisms, but also 
social and political ones. 
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